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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We studied  three  forms  of dyadic  communication  involving  theory  of  mind  (ToM)  in  82
children  with  traumatic  brain  injury  (TBI) and  61  children  with  orthopedic  injury  (OI):  Cog-
nitive  (concerned  with  false  belief),  Affective  (concerned  with expressing  socially  deceptive
facial expressions),  and  Conative  (concerned  with  inﬂuencing  another’s  thoughts  or feel-
ings). We  analyzed  the pattern  of brain  lesions  in  the TBI  group  and  conducted  voxel-based
morphometry  for all participants  in ﬁve  large-scale  functional  brain  networks,  and  related
lesion and volumetric  data  to  ToM  outcomes.  Children  with  TBI  exhibited  difﬁculty  with
Cognitive,  Affective,  and  Conative  ToM.  The  perturbation  threshold  for Cognitive  ToM  is
higher than that  for Affective  and Conative  ToM,  in  that Severe  TBI  disturbs  Cognitive  ToM
but even  Mild–Moderate  TBI  disrupt  Affective  and  Conative  ToM. Childhood  TBI was  asso-
ciated  with  damage  to all ﬁve  large-scale  brain  networks.  Lesions  in  the  Mirror  Neuron
Empathy  network  predicted  lower  Conative  ToM  involving  ironic  criticism  and  empathic
praise.  Conative  ToM  was  signiﬁcantly  and  positively  related  to  the  package  of Default
Mode,  Central  Executive,  and  Mirror  Neuron  Empathy  networks  and,  more  speciﬁcally,  to
two hubs  of  the Default  Mode  Network,  the  posterior  cingulate/retrosplenial  cortex  and
the hippocampal  formation,  including  entorhinal  cortex  and parahippocampal  cortex.∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, The Hospital for
ick Children, 555 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5G  1X8.
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1. Introduction
Humans are social animals whose cognitive activity
often occurs within an interpersonal context. While social
competence continues to improve into the teen years,
most typically developing children, by the time they
attend school, have mastered a palette of social cognitive
skills that allow them to act as partners in social dyads
al Cogni26 M.  Dennis et al. / Development
and groups in which social-cognitive-affective information
ﬂows back and forth.
A  component of social cognition is theory of mind (ToM),
which involves mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2003), the abil-
ity  to think about mental states in oneself and others and
to  use this information to understand what other people
know  and predict how they will act. The term ToM empha-
sizes  that individuals see themselves and others in terms
of  mental states that result in (and from) human action
(Wellman et al., 2001). In the paradigmatic false belief ToM
task  (Wimmer  and Perner, 1983), people entertain beliefs
that  contradict reality and act in accordance with their
beliefs. For example, Child A exhibits ToM if he or she judges
that  Child B will search for a candy in a red cup because
Child B believes it to be hidden there, even if Child A knows
that  it is actually hidden in a blue cup.
As interest in ToM grew, the term was applied to an
ever broadening range of constructs, from inferences about
other’s  judgments regarding object locations to self-reports
of  lending money to others as a measure of empathy. In
part  as a result of new behavioral and neuroimaging evi-
dence  (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Hein and
Singer,  2008), ToM was partitioned into cognitive ToM, con-
cerned  with cognitive beliefs and reading the content of
people’s  minds, and affective ToM, concerned with emo-
tional  states and functions involving affective inﬂuence,
such as empathy.
While  a separation of cognition from emotion is use-
ful,  we also distinguish between expressing what one feels
or  wishes to appear to feel (affective ToM) and exerting
inﬂuence on what someone else feels (conative ToM). Prag-
matic  linguistics of the Prague school identiﬁed a conative
communicative function concerned with exerting social
inﬂuence (Jakobson, 1960) to make others feel good or bad
about  themselves.
1.1.  A model of ToM
We  propose a tripartite model of ToM (Fig. 1) that dis-
tinguishes three types of ToM: cognitive, affective, and
conative.
1.  Cognitive ToM. This is the original mindreading sense of
ToM, concerned with false belief.
Fig. 1. Tripartite theory of mtive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39
2.  Affective ToM. Facial emotion expresses feelings (emo-
tional expression), but also what we  want people to think
we feel (emotive communication, in which the expression
on the face is consciously pantomimed or even decep-
tive). Emotive communication is a form of affective ToM
(Hein and Singer, 2008).
3. Conative ToM. This refers to forms of social communica-
tion in which one person tries to inﬂuence the mental and
emotional state of another. Ironic criticism and empathic
praise are prototypical forms of conative ToM.
For  each type of ToM, a key task requires ToM and a
control task involves the same task demands but without
the  ToM construct of interest. For example, Cognitive ToM
is  measured by false belief and the control condition of the
same  form involves true belief. Table 1 shows the link of
ToM  type to speciﬁc ToM and Control tasks.
1.2. Neurological bases of ToM
The brain is organized in terms of a number of
large-scale functional networks involving distributed brain
regions  (e.g., Menon, 2011), and any complex cognitive
activity such as social cognition must involve large-scale
functional brain networks. Neuroimaging evidence has
implicated several brain regions in a range of social cog-
nitive  tasks (e.g., Lieberman, 2007). In approaching the
neural  basis of social cognition, we  consider the effects of
damage  to and post-injury volumes of the three main large-
scale  brain networks (the Default Mode Network, DMN;
the  Central Executive Network, CEN; and the Salience Net-
work,  SN) and two  social cognitive networks identiﬁed
from lesion deﬁcit and neuroimaging studies (a Mentaliz-
ing  Network, MN,  and a Mirror Neuron/Empathy Network,
MNEN). Table 2 deﬁnes and describes the function of and
neural  structures within each network.
1.3. ToM in children with traumatic brain injury
ToM has been studied in typically developing preschool-
ers, in adults with behavioral and neurological pathologies
(Bibby and McDonald, 2005), and in children with neurode-
velopmenal and acquired brain disorders. ToM, broadly
construed, is impaired in various developmental disorders
that  are associated with poor social function, including
ind (ToM) model.
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Table  1
Three types of theory of mind: Cognitive, affective, and conative.
Type of ToM Basis of ToM ToM task Control task
Cognitive ToM False belief What A thinks B thinks based on
B’s false belief
What A thinks B thinks based
on B’s true belief
Affective  ToM Facial deception What A wants B to think A feels What A feels
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utism (Hill and Frith, 2003), ADHD (Uekermann et al.,
010),  spina biﬁda (Dennis and Barnes, 1993), and fetal
lcohol spectrum disorder (Greenbaum et al., 2009). Poor
oM  has also been reported in acquired brain disorders of
hildhood,  including traumatic brain injury (TBI). Children
ith  TBI display impairments in social-affective functions,
ncluding pragmatic language, the understanding of men-
al  state language, the production of speech acts, the
nderstanding of the social function of emotional expres-
ions,  the comprehension of the intentions involved in
xerting  social inﬂuence through sarcastic or empathic
able 2
eural networks.
Neural network Description
Default Mode Network (DMN)
• Concerned with self-related cognitive
Menon,  2011)
•  Typically activated during wakeful res
•  Anchored in medial prefrontal cortex 
parietal  lobule and hippocampal format
et  al., 2008)
Central Executive Network
(CEN)
•  Concerned with future planning, decis
2011)
•  Typically activated during externally p
• Anchored in dorsolateral prefrontal an
• Distinct patterns of subcortical connec
thalamus  (Menon, 2011)
Salience  Network (SN)
• Concerned with detecting and orientin
segregating  the most relevant among th
•  Important role in error monitoring and
and  deactivation of large-scale network
cognitive  control (Sridharan et al., 2008
• Necessary for efﬁcient regulation of ac
cognitive  control (Bonnelle et al., 2012)
•  Involves orbitofrontal cortex (involved
et  al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2004); insu
et al., 2012; Dawes et al., 2012); anterio
emotions;  Singer et al., 2004, 2006); am
relevant  stimuli, such as faces; Adolphs
•  Anchored in fronto-insular and dorsal
• Extensive connectivity with structures
including  human emotions and reward 
et  al., 2006)
Mentalizing Network (MN)
• Refers to the ability to think about me
network  (Hein and Singer, 2008; Kalbe 
•  Anchored in dorsomedial prefrontal co
temporal  pole (Hein and Singer, 2008; K
et  al., 2010)
Mirror Neuron Empathy
Network  (MNEN)
•  Originally identiﬁed as neurons that ﬁ
is  passively observed (Rizzolatti and Cra
•  Involved in imitation, action understa
(Gallese  and Goldman, 1998); empathic
•  Anchored in ventral premotor area, in
triangularis (Hadjikhani et al., 2006; Mo
2012; Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007)s B to think about B’s
elf where what is said
y what is meant
What  A wants B to think about
B’s actions and self where what
is said is literally what is meant
communications, and the ability to produce coherent social
discourse (Chapman et al., 2004; Dennis et al., 1998, 2001;
Dennis  and Barnes, 2000, 2001; Yeates et al., 2007).
Recently, we  have studied social cognition in children
with traumatic brain injury (TBI) using the three tasks in
Fig.  1 and Table 1 (Dennis et al., 2012, 2013, in press). The
tasks  are illustrated in Fig. 2.Children with TBI, compared to peers with orthopedic
injuries (OI), exhibited difﬁculty on all three ToM tasks
(Dennis et al., 2012, 2013, in press). Presently, we  report
on  the behavioral and neural bases of these difﬁculties.
 activity; autobiographical and social functions (Buckner et al., 2008;
t; deactivated during externally prompted cognitive processing
and posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex (Menon, 2011); inferior
ion, including entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex (Buckner
ion-making, and control of attention and working memory (Menon,
rompted cognitive processing
d posterior parietal cortices (Menon, 2011)
tivity, including dorsal caudate nucleus and anterior and dorsomedial
g to salient internal and external events (Menon, 2011) and
em in order to guide behavior (Menon and Uddin, 2010)
 reactive control, thereby controlling the switch between activation
s such as CEN and DMN to modulate both exogenous and endogenous
)
tivity in DMN; failure of regulation after TBI leads to inefﬁcient
; also involved in affect
 in valuation of stimuli in general and rewards in particular; Delgado
la (cognition-emotion interface and socially egalitarian behavior; Gu
r cingulate cortex (part of a circuit implicated in pain and negative
ygdala (processes current stimulus valence of emotionally and socially
, 2010)
 anterior cingulate cortices (Menon, 2011)
 involved in the registration and utilization of affective information,
(Adolphs, 2010; Kober et al., 2008; Menon, 2011; Singer, 2004; Singer
ntal states in oneself and others; related to a cognitive ToM brain
et al., 2010)
rtex, superior temporal sulcus, temporo-parietal junction, and
albe et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Zaitchik
re not only when an action is performed but also when a similar action
ighero, 2004)
nding, and social cognition (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010); empathy
 interpersonal dyadic interactions (Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007)
ferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis and pars
lenberghs et al., 2012; Rameson and Lieberman, 2009; Rameson et al.,
28 M.  Dennis et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39
Fig. 2. Sample stimuli and descriptions of ToM tasks. Top panel (Jack and Jill task): participants were shown three consecutive frames (stimulus
duration indicated under each frame; interstimulus interval indicated on arrows) on a computer screen. Each frame included a character (Jack and/or
Jill),  two hats (red and blue), and a ball. In Frame A of each sequence, Jack is preparing to drop a ball into either a blue or red hat (here, blue) while Jill watches.
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.4. Study objectives
This  paper investigates aspects of the behavioral and
eural basis of the tripartite ToM model in Fig. 1 and Table 1,
sing  children with TBI and OI controls who were tested on
ach  form of ToM, described above. We  have three speciﬁc
ims:
1)  To compare cognitive, affective, and conative ToM in chil-
dren with TBI and OI controls. We  predict:
(a)  a group main effect whereby children with TBI perform
more poorly overall than those with OI;
b)  a task demand main effect whereby measures requir-
ing ToM (Switched Unwitnessed trials on the Cognitive
ToM task, Emotive Communication items on the Affec-
tive ToM task, and Ironic Criticism and Empathic Praise
items on the Conative ToM task) will be performed
more  poorly by all children than control items of the
same format (Switched Witnessed trials on the Cog-
nitive ToM task, Emotional Expression items on the
Affective ToM task, and Literal Truth items on the Cona-
tive ToM task);
(c) a main effect of ToM type whereby Cognitive ToM will be
performed better than either Affective or Conative ToM
because the latter require more effortful, conscious
processing to override habitual modes of communica-
tion  (letting the face express true feeling in the Affective
ToM task and saying something different from what is
meant in the Conative ToM task);
d)  a group by ToM main effect whereby children with TBI
will ﬁnd ToM tasks disproportionately more difﬁcult
than will children with OI.
2) To report patterns of damage to components of ﬁve func-
tional brain networks in children with TBI compared to
OI controls. Given the vulnerability to TBI of frontal,
temporal, and limbic areas because of their proxim-
ity to skull bones (Yeates et al., 2007), we expected
that  lesions in the ﬁve functional networks (which have
frontal, temporal, and limbic hubs) will be common
n Frame B, Jack either moves the ball further into the blue hat (unswitched tria
resent  in half of Frame B trials (witnessed trials) and absent in the other half (
bout  the location of the ball is correct or incorrect. Jill’s judgment depends on w
hoose  the original (Frame A) hat if she did not witness the switch. The study con
nswitched–Unwitnessed, Switched–Witnessed, Switched–Unwitnessed. The ToM
n  which the switch was  witnessed. Middle panel (Emotional and Emotive Faces
appiness,  sadness, fear, disgust, and anger, involving a discrepancy between Ter
 tummy ache. If her mom  knew about the tummy  ache she wouldn’t let Terry g
ondition)  and how she looked on her face (Emotive condition) by selecting a fa
core  (“Look on Face” questions), which measures the emotion on the face as a 
he  Emotional Expression score (“Feel Inside” questions), which measures the em
ottom  panel (Ironic Criticism and Empathic Praise Task): two social dyads are 
resentation of a picture, a narrative, and an audiotape of the speaker’s utterances
n  all three bicycle scenarios, Sally tells John he has done a good job ﬁxing the bicy
riticism  scenario, Sally believes John has done a poor job and her intent is to con
ohn  has done a poor job but her intent is to convey a positive, comforting evalua
he  outcome (e.g., “the bicycle was. . .”), and informed about the speaker’s charact
eople”;  “she liked to cheer people up”) and what the speaker said to the hearer
hought  about the event, what the speaker thought about the hearer) and intenti
he  speaker wanted the hearer to think about him- or herself). The key measures
n  opaque relation between words and meaning, and a negative second-order int
n  opaque relation between words and meaning, and a positive second-order int
or  the purposes of the current paper.tive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39 29
for children with TBI, particularly those with severe
injuries. We  also expected volumetric reductions in any
or all of the networks.
(3) To test speciﬁc hypotheses about the relation of ToM
type in children with TBI and OI controls to damage to
functional brain networks. We test the following spe-
ciﬁc predictions: (a) Cognitive ToM will be related to
the MN;  (b) Affective ToM will be related to the SN;
(c) Conative ToM will be related to the MNEN network;
and; (d) Affective and Conative ToM require conscious
manipulation of thought and feeling, so they will be
related to the integrity of the CEN, whereas Cognitive
ToM, which has a more automatic character (see, e.g.,
Senju, 2012), will not; and (e) All three forms of ToM,
involving reacting to outside stimuli as well as to self-
reﬂection, will be related to the DMN.
2.  Materials and methods
2.1.  Participants
Participants included children previously hospitalized
for either a TBI or OI who were 8–13 years of age and who
were  injured between 12 to 63 months before testing. All
children  were injured after 3 years of age, most after 4 years
of  age.
For both TBI and OI groups, we applied the following
exclusion criteria: (a) history of more than one serious
injury requiring medical treatment; (b) premorbid neu-
rological disorder or mental retardation; (c) any injury
resulting from child abuse or assault; (d) a history of severe
psychiatric disorder requiring hospitalization prior to the
injury;  (e) sensory or motor impairment that prevented
valid administration of study measures; (f) primary lan-
guage  other than English; and (g) medical contraindication
to MRI  or behavioral study. Children in full-time special
education classrooms were excluded (in all but one case),
although those with a history of premorbid learning or
attention problems were not excluded.
ls; not shown) or switches the ball to the red hat (switched trials). Jill is
unwitnessed trials). In Frame C, participants decide whether Jill’s belief
hat she believes about the ball’s location, not its actual location: She will
sisted of 32 trials, 8 for each of four trial types: Unswitched–Witnessed,
 trials involve an unwitnessed switch of hat color; control trials are those
 Task): Participants listen to 25 short narratives, ﬁve for each involving
ry’s “inside” feeling and her facial expression (e.g., “Terry woke up with
o out to play.”) Participants were asked how Terry felt inside (Emotional
ce from the display. The ToM condition is the Emotive Communication
deceptive representation of what is felt inside. The control condition is
otion on the face as a transparent read-out of the emotion experienced.
shown in six situations (ﬁxing a bicycle is pictured), with simultaneous
 recorded with neutral, ironic, or empathic intonation (totaling 18 trials).
cle. In the Literal Truth scenario, this matches the actual job. In the Ironic
vey a negative evaluation. In the Empathic Praise scenario, Sally believes
tion. Participants were told the task goal (e.g., to repair a bicycle), shown
er (e.g., “she liked to chat and talk to people”; “she liked to bug and annoy
 (e.g., “You did a great job”). Questions probed beliefs (what the speaker
ons (what the speaker wanted the hearer to think about the event, what
 are Literal Truth (control task), Ironic Criticism (conative ToM task, with
ention toward the hearer), and Empathic Praise (conative ToM task, with
ention toward the hearer). Scores for irony and empathy were combined
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Table  3
Demographic characteristics of entire sample.
Characteristic OI (n = 61) TBI-Mild-Moderate (n = 57) TBI-Severe (n = 25) F(2)
M SD M SD M SD
Age at injury (years) 7.8 1.8 8.0 1.9 7.5 2.1 0.611
Age at testing (years) 10.6 1.7 10.5 1.5 9.9 1.5 1.752
Time from injury to
testing  (years)
2.8 1.0 2.6 1.2 2.5 1.2 1.162
SES 0.30 1.01 −0.14 1.00 −0.41 0.77 5.779***
WASI IQ 109.9 13.4 99.8 14.6 97.7 14.3 10.306***
Glasgow Coma Scale 15  0 13.8 2.0 4.0 1.7 –
Sex (female; male) 24 female, 37 male 19 female, 38 male 9 female, 16 male (0.462)
Ethnicity 54 Caucasian, 3
African/Caribbean
descent,  3 Multiracial,
45  Caucasian, 6
African/Caribbean
descent,  4 Multiracial,
 Unspe
19 Caucasian, 3
African/Caribbean
descent,  0 Multiracial,
–1  Unspeciﬁed 2
*** p < 0.01.
Recruitment occurred in three metropolitan sites:
Toronto (Canada), Columbus (US) and Cleveland (US).
Among children eligible to participate and approached
about the study, 82 (47%) of those with TBI and 61 (26%) of
those  with OI agreed to enroll. The participation rate was
signiﬁcantly higher for TBI than OI participants. However,
participants and non-participants in both groups did not
differ  in age at injury, age at initial contact about the study,
sex,  race, or census tract measures of socioeconomic sta-
tus  (SES; i.e., mean family income, percentage of minority
heads of household, and percentage of households below
the  poverty line). Participants and non-participants also did
not  differ on measures of injury severity (i.e., mean length
of  stay, median Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale and
Jennett,  1974) score for children with TBI).
The human data included in this manuscript were
obtained in compliance with formal ethics review com-
mittees at the participating institutions in Columbus,
Toronto, and Cleveland. Parent consent and child assent
was  obtained prior to testing. The TBI group had a lowest
GCS  score of 12 or less after resuscitation, or 13-15 score
with  positive imaging for brain insult or depressed skull
fracture. The children with TBI were grouped by injury
severity: GCS scores 9-15 deﬁned a Complicated Mild-
Moderate TBI group (n = 57) and GCS scores 3-8 deﬁned a
Severe  TBI group (n = 25). The OI group (n = 61) consisted
of  children who sustained fractures that involved hospital
admission but that were not associated with any loss of
consciousness or other risks or indications of brain injury
(e.g.,  skull or facial fractures).
Table  3 shows participant demographics, including
sex, race, socioeconomic status (Yeates and Taylor, 1997),
estimated full-scale IQ obtained using the Wechsler Abbre-
viated  Scale of Intelligence (Stano, 1999), age at injury, age
at  time of test, and time since injury, mechanism of injury,
and  day-of-injury CT information. The socioeconomic com-
posite  index (SCI, Yeates and Taylor, 1997) was signiﬁcantly
higher for OI than for either TBI group, with the Severe TBI
having  the lowest mean SCI. The groups also differed in
the  distribution of mechanism of injury, with injuries aris-
ing  from motorized vehicles being most common among
Severe TBI and those arising from sports and recreational
events being most common among OI participants. Becauseciﬁed 3  Unspeciﬁed
group  differences in SCI were no longer signiﬁcant when
injury  mechanism was  taken into account, we  did not treat
SCI  as a covariate in data analyses, because the SCI differ-
ences appeared to be intrinsic to the injury groups. When
a  covariate is an attribute of a disorder, or is intrinsic to the
condition, it is not meaningful and can be potentially mis-
leading  to “adjust” for differences in the covariate (Dennis
et  al., 2009a). Our ﬁndings are consistent with epidemi-
ological studies showing that the risk of TBI, particularly
those linked to motorized vehicles, is highest for children of
lower  SCI and minority status (Brown, 2010; Howard et al.,
2005;  Langlois et al., 2005; McKinlay et al., 2010; Parslow
et  al., 2005; Yates et al., 2006).
2.2. Behavioral measures
Sample  stimuli for the three types of ToM are illustrated
in Fig. 2 and task details are described in the ﬁgure cap-
tion.  The Jack and Jill task (Dennis et al., 2012) measures
cognitive ToM with a series of switched unwitnessed trials
that  measure false belief, compared to a series of control
(switched witnessed) trials that measure true belief. The
Emotional and Emotive Faces task (Dennis et al., 2013)
measures affective ToM with trials requiring identiﬁca-
tion of emotions expressed for social purposes (Emotive
communication) compared to control trials requiring iden-
tiﬁcation  of emotions actually felt (Emotional expression).
The Ironic Criticism and Empathic praise task (Dennis et al.,
2001,  in press) measures conative ToM with trials requir-
ing  the child to identify the beliefs and conative intentions
underlying referentially opaque communications involving
irony  and empathy, compared to control trials probing for
beliefs  and intentions in literally true statements.
2.3. MRI brain imaging
A  research-quality MRI  was obtained for each child
(details in Bigler et al., under review). Magnetic ﬁeld
strength was  1.5 T for all studies. The Toronto and
Columbus sites used GE Signa Excite scanners and the
Cleveland site used a Siemens Symphony scanner. All
sites  acquired the following sequences on each partici-
pant: thin slice, volume acquisition T1-weighted ultrafast
M. Dennis et al. / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39 31
Table  4
Neural networks and associated Freesurfer regions.
Neural network Fresurfer regions
Default Mode Network (DMN)
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) Frontal pole + medial orbito-frontal cortex
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) Posterior cingulate + cingulate isthmus
Inferior parietal lobule (IPL) Inferior parietal lobe + precuneus
Hippocampal formation (HF) Hippocampus + entorhinal cortex + parahippocampal cortex
Central  Executive Network (CEN)
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) Superior frontal cortex + caudal middle frontal cortex + rostral middle frontal cortex
Posterior parietal cortex (PPC) Inferior parietal cortex + superior parietal cortex + precuneus
Caudate nucleus (CN) Caudate volume
Thalamus (TH) Thalamus volume
Salience Network (SN)
Ventrolateral  prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) Pars orbitalis
Insula (I) Insula short volume + insula large central volume
Anterior  cingulate cortex (ACC) Rostral anterior cingulate + caudal anterior cingulate
Amygdala  (A) Amygdala volume
Mentalizing Network (MN)
Dorsomedial  prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) Caudal middle frontal cortex + rostral middle frontal cortex
Superior  temporal sulcus (STS) Superior temporal gyrus + bank superior temporal sulcus + middle temporal gyrus
Temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) Supramarginal gyrus
Temporal pole (TP) Temporal pole
Mirror Neuron Empathy Network (MNEN)
Premotor area (PMA) Caudal middle frontal
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eInferior parietal lobule (IPL) I
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis (IFG, po) P
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis (IFG, pt) P
D Gradient Echo, commonly referred to as MPRAGE or
SPGR  (depending on scanner manufacturer); a dual-echo
roton density (PD)/T2 weighted sequence; ﬂuid atten-
ated  inversion recovery (FLAIR); and gradient recalled
cho (GRE). For the current study, MRI  images were
eviewed by author EDB for evidence of lesions within
he  large-scale networks of interest. Lesions were deﬁned
s  areas of old cortical contusion and/or focal region
f encephalomalacia (based primarily on the T1, PD/T2
nd/or GRE sequences), hemosiderin deposit reﬂecting
rior hemorrhagic lesions, (identiﬁed on the PD/T2 and
RE  sequences), or prominent focal white matter hyper-
ntensity (based upon the PD/T2 and FLAIR sequences).
olumetric data were obtained using Freesurfer version
.1  (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) following meth-
ds  previously outlined (see Bigler et al., 2010). Total
olumes for each of the ﬁve networks were computed using
egions  of interest (ROI) deﬁned in Freesurfer variables (see
esikan  et al., 2006) (Table 4).
.4. Data analysis
.4.1.  Behavior
All  data were converted to percentage of correct
esponses and entered into a repeated measures analysis
f  variance (ANOVA) with group membership (OI vs. Mild-
oderate TBI vs. Severe TBI) as a between-subjects factor,
nd  Type of ToM (Cognitive vs. Affective vs. Conative) and
ask  Demand (ToM vs. Control) as within-subjects factors.
.4.2.  MRI
Chi-square analyses were used to compare the pres-
nce or absence of network lesions between each TBI group
nd  the OI group, and to compare the two TBI groups to
ach  other. To study the relationship between behavioralarietal lobe + precuneus
cularis
gularis
and  MRI  lesion results for the TBI participants, the ﬁve
networks were entered into simple linear regressions by
hypotheses, for the key ToM constructs (Switched Unwit-
nessed, Emotive, and Ironic Criticism + Empathic Praise),
with  lesions within each network coded as absent (0),
unilateral (1), or bilateral (2). Volumetric data for the
entire sample were analyzed using multivariate analyses
of  variance (MANOVA) with Group membership as the
between-subjects factor and network (DMN vs. CEN vs.
SN  vs. MN vs. MNEN) and region of interest (entered into
separate MANOVAs as in Table 4) as the within-subjects
factors. Regression analyses were conducted to examine
the  relationship of the 5 network volumes to the key ToM
constructs by hypotheses.
3.  Results
3.1. Behavior
120 of the 143 participants enrolled in the study (52 OI,
48  Mild-Moderate TBI, and 20 Severe TBI) completed all
three  behavioral ToM tasks, so only their data were used
for  the repeated measures ANOVA.
The main effect of Group was  signiﬁcant,
F(2,117) = 9.573, p < .001, with the OI group perform-
ing marginally better than Mild-Moderate TBI group
(p  = .070) and signiﬁcantly better than the Severe TBI
group (p < .001); accuracy across tasks was  76% vs. 71%
vs.  62%, respectively. The difference between the two  TBI
groups  was signiﬁcant (p = .004). The main effect of Type
of  ToM also was  signiﬁcant, F(2,116) = 6.199, p = .003, with
marginally higher accuracy on the Cognitive than Affective
ToM  (p = .094) and signiﬁcantly lower accuracy on the
Affective than Conative ToM (p = .001) (70% vs. 67% vs. 72%,
respectively); Cognitive and Conative ToM did not differ
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Fig. 3. Accuracy by group over three types of ToM. Mild-Moderate TBI did
and  Conative ToM (p = .053). Severe TBI differed on all three types of ToM
(p = .496). The main effect of Task Demand was signiﬁcant,
F(1,117) = 247.73, p < .001, such that accuracy was  higher
on  control than ToM communications (81% vs. 59%).
The  interaction between Group and Type of ToM (Fig. 3)
was  not signiﬁcant, F(4,232) = .417, p = .796.The  interaction between Group and Task Demand, illus-
trated  in Fig. 4, was signiﬁcant, F(2,117) = 5.268, p = .006.
Accuracy was higher on Control vs. ToM condition for
all  three groups but the two TBI groups had different
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Fig. 4. Accuracy by group on ToM vs. Control tasks. Performance was signiﬁcantly
(p  < .001). Within ToM conditions, the OI group was signiﬁcantly more accurate
Mild-Moderate  TBI group was signiﬁcantly more accurate than the Severe TBI gr
groups  did not differ (p = .508), but the Severe TBI group was  signiﬁcantly less accerate TBI-Severe
er from OI on Cognitive ToM (p = .490) but did differ on Affective (p = .024)
9, <.001, .001, respectively).
performance proﬁles from the OI group: on the Control
condition, the Mild-Moderate TBI group did not differ from
the  OI group (p = .597), whereas the Severe TBI group was
signiﬁcantly poorer than the OI group (p = .004). On the ToM
condition,  both TBI groups were signiﬁcantly poorer than
the  OI group (p < .05).
The Type of ToM × Task Demand interaction, illustrated
in Fig. 5, was  signiﬁcant, F(2,116) = 4.671, p = .011. Accu-
racy  was affected by type of ToM (Cognitive vs. Affective vs.
Control
and
derate TBI-Severe
** *
*
**p<.0 5, ***p<.001
 better on Control than on ToM conditions within each of the three groups
 than the Mild-Moderate (p = .022) and Severe (p < .001) TBI groups; the
oup (p = .007). Within Control conditions, the OI and Mild-Moderate TBI
urate than either OI (p = .004) or Mild-Moderate TBI (p = .019) group.
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Fig. 5. Accuracy by type of ToM and Task Demand (ToM vs. Control). Within all three types of ToM, performance was signiﬁcantly better on Control than
on  ToM conditions (p < .001 for each domain). Within Control conditions, performance was  signiﬁcantly better on Cognitive than either Affective (p < .001)
or  Conative (p = .044) ToM, and better on the Conative than the Affective domain (p < .001). Within ToM conditions, performance was  similar on Cognitive
and  Affective domains (p = .427), but marginally better for Conative than either Cognitive (p = .071) or Affective (p = .075) ToM.
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Fig. 6. Performance across the three ToM tasks broken down by Group and Task Demand (ToM vs. Control). Within the Cognitive task, Severe TBI was
signiﬁcantly  worse than OI on ToM trials (p = .015) but not on Control trials (p = .168), whereas Mild-Moderate TBI did not differ on either ToM (p = .252) or
Control  (p = .565) trials. Within the Affective task, Severe TBI was  signiﬁcantly worse than OI on both ToM (p < .001) and Control trials (p < .001), whereas
Mild-Moderate TBI was signiﬁcantly worse than OI only on ToM (p = .015) but not Control trials (p = .219). Within the Conative task, Severe TBI and
Mild-Moderate TBI were signiﬁcantly worse than OI on ToM trials (p < .001 and p = .003) but not on Control trials (p = .229 and p = .193).
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Table  5
Percentage of each group with lesions in the neural networks of interest.
Neural network OI (n = 61) Mild–Moderate TBI (n = 45) Severe TBI (n = 20)
DMN – 18%, 2%†,# 30%, 20%‡,#
CEN – 24%, –†,# 40%, 10%‡,#
SN – 7%, –# 30%, 5%‡,#
MN – 27%, 2%† 50%, 5%‡
MNEN – 2%, –# 15%, 5%‡,#
 of whetNote: Signiﬁcant group difference for the presence of any lesion, regardless
‡ OI vs. TBI-Severe, #TBI-Mild-Moderate vs. TBI-Severe.
Of  interest, 48% of the sample sustained lesions in the DMN.
Conative), but the way in which accuracy was affected was
different  in the Control vs. ToM conditions. Comparing cog-
nitive  and affective results, on the ToM condition accuracy
was  similar (p = .398) on the Cognitive and Affective tasks,
but  on the Control condition accuracy was signiﬁcantly
higher on Cognitive than Affective (p < .001). Comparing
cognitive and conative results, on the ToM condition accu-
racy  was signiﬁcantly higher on the Conative than on the
Cognitive  task (p = .05), but on the Control condition accu-
racy  was marginally higher on Cognitive than on Conative
(p  = .055). Finally, comparing affective and conative results,
accuracy was signiﬁcantly higher on the Conative than on
the  Affective task on both the ToM (p = .049) and Control
(p  < .001) conditions.
The three-way interaction between Group, Type of ToM,
and  Task Demand (illustrated in Fig. 6) was not signiﬁcant,
F(4,232) = 1.947, p = .103, indicating that the Group × Task
Demand interaction did not differ signiﬁcantly across Type
of  ToM.
3.2. MRI: lesion
MRI  scans were available for 111 participants (46 OI, 45
Mild-Moderate TBI, and 20 Severe TBI).
Results for the lesion sample are in Table 5. Relative
to the Mild–Moderate TBI group, the Severe TBI group
sustained signiﬁcantly more frequent lesions to 4 of 5
networks, and had more bilateral lesions.3.3. Lesion and behavior
The  regression models (Table 6) were not signiﬁ-
cant for Cognitive (R2 = .001, F(2,60) = 0.024, p = .976) or
Table 6
Regression models predicting Cognitive, Affective, and Conative ToM
based on lesion data.
ToM domain B SE B  ˇ p-Value
Cognitive
DMN  1.758 8.038 .029 .828
MN −.406 9.127 −.006 .965
Affective
DMN −.022 4.312 −.001 .996
CEN 9.413 5.218 .253 .076
SN −.708 7.108 −.015 .921
Conative
DMN −1.491 3.422 −.055 .665
CEN 7.080 4.153 .213 .094
MNEN −32.937 11.239 −.374 .005
Note: In Conative ToM, only lesions in the MNEN signiﬁcantly predicted
performance.her lesion was  unilateral or bilateral, at p < .05: †OI vs. TBI-Mild-Moderate,
Affective (R2 = .061, F(3,59) = 1.272, p = .292) ToM. The
regression model for Conative ToM was signiﬁcant
(R2 = .183, F(3,53) = 3.969, p = .013), with the only signiﬁ-
cant regressor being the MNEN network (p = .005), such
that  fewer MNEN lesions were related to better irony and
empathy scores.
3.4.  MRI: volume
MRI  scans for 106 participants (47 OI, 41 Mild-Moderate
TBI, and 18 Severe TBI) were of sufﬁcient quality for
Freesurfer analyses to produce volumetric data. One OI was
an  extreme outlier in terms of volume and his data were
excluded from subsequent analyses.
The three groups did not differ in total intracranial
volume, F(2,99) = 1.071, p = .347, nor were there any signif-
icant  interactions between Group and Sex, F(2,99) = .995,
p  = .373. Therefore, total intracranial volume was not used
as  a covariate in subsequent analyses.
For the network analyses, the overall MANOVA was
signiﬁcant, F(5,99) = 3.796, p = .003 as were the MANOVAs
within in the individual networks. Group differences in net-
work  and region volume are presented in Table 7.
3.5.  Volume and behavior
The  regression models (Table 8) were not signiﬁcant for
Cognitive (R2 = .015, F(2,101) = .767, p = .467) or Affective
(R2 = .053, F(3,97) = 1.803, p = .152), but were signiﬁcant for
Conative  (R2 = .097, F(3,91) = 3.258, p = .025) ToM.
We explored the relation between Conative ToM and
speciﬁc regions of interest in the DMN, CEN, and MNEN, the
package  of which was signiﬁcantly related to function. Of
12  regions, 8 were signiﬁcantly related to Conative ToM, all
in  a positive manner such that greater volume was  related
to  better performance. Correcting for multiple comparisons
with p = .004, two  signiﬁcant structure–function relations
emerged involving posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex
(r  = .317, p = .002) and hippocampal formation, including
entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex (r = .310,
p  = .002).
4. Discussion
Study results support the hypothesis that children with
TBI  have difﬁculty in Cognitive, Affective, and Conative
ToM. Affective and Conative ToM have a lower threshold
for perturbation than does Cognitive ToM, in that these
types  of ToM are vulnerable to even milder forms of TBI.
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Table  7
Group differences in volumes of neural networks and regions of interest.
Network/region OI TBI-Mild-Moderate TBI-Severe F p-Value
DMN  169,200 176,388 159,691‡,# 6.048 0.003
vmPFC 22,887 23,253 22,384 0.651 ns
PCC 28,469 29,240 26,510‡,# 4.665 0.012
IPL  95,933 101,453† 90,896# 6.386 0.002
HF  21,911 22,442 19,900‡,# 7.899 0.001
CEN 204,155 208,326 190,645‡,# 4.693 0.011
dlPFC 71,930 73,443 67,548# 2.695 0.072
PPC 109,967 113,072 102,313‡,# 5.254 0.007
CN  7766 7539 7491 0.630 ns
TH  14,492 14,272 13,293‡,# 3.985 0.022
SN  63,904 64,305 59,963‡,# 3.384 0.038
vlPFC 8364 8499 7986 1.900 ns
I  31,950 31,729 29,885‡ 2.361 0.099
ACC 20,569 21,037 19,368# 2.786 0.066
A  3021 3041 2724‡,# 4.895 0.009
MN  234,098 237,463 218,811‡,# 4.153 0.018
dmPFC 93,214 95,411 88,038# 2.775 0.067
STS 91,364 91,760 83,799‡,# 4.741 0.011
TPJ 42,899 43,668 40,534 1.774 ns
TP  6620 6624 6441 0.356 ns
MNEN 156,148 161,272 149,199# 3.298 0.041
PMA  27,154 27,001 26,071 0.430 ns
IPL  95,933 101,453† 90,896# 6.386 0.002
iFG, po 17,150 17,001 16,814 0.154 ns
iFG, pt 15,912 15,817 15,418 0.357 ns
N , ‡OI vs. 
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fote: Signiﬁcant (p < .05) analyses comparing †OI vs. TBI-Mild-Moderate
arginally  larger DMN (p = .055) volumes than OI. TBI-Severe has margin
lPFC  (p = .083), ACC (p = .087), and dmFPC (p = .096) volumes than OI.
hildhood TBI damaged both large scale brain networks
nd networks concerned with mentalizing and empathy.
esions of the MNEN network disrupted Conative ToM.
onative ToM was also related to the overall status of DMN,
EN,  and MNEN, and to two hubs of the DMN, in partic-
lar: the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, and the
ippocampal formation, including entorhinal cortex and
arahippocampal cortex.
.1.  Cognitive architecture of social cognition
The ToM effect was robust. All groups found control con-
itions  easier than ToM conditions. For each type of ToM,
he  difference between ToM and control conditions was
argest  for Severe TBI, intermediate for Mild-Moderate TBI,
nd  smallest for OI, showing that children with Severe TBI
ere  more generally challenged by these tasks, whereas
able 8
egression models predicting Cognitive, Affective, and Conative ToM based on vo
ToM domain B SE B 
Cognitive
DMN  .000 .000 
MN  .000 .000 
Affective
DMN  .000 .000 
CEN  .000 .000 
SN  .000 .001 
Conative
DMN  .000 .000 
CEN  .000 .000 
MNEN  .000 .000 
ote: In Conative ToM, no individual predictor reached signiﬁcance, although th
urther  with correction for multiple comparisons.TBI-Severe, #TBI-Mild-Moderate vs. TBI-Severe. TBI-Mild-Moderate has
ller I (p = .066) volumes than TBI-Mild–Moderate and marginally smaller
those  with Mild-Moderate TBI had more speciﬁc difﬁculty
with  ToM requirements.
What  is difﬁcult about tasks requiring ToM? For one
thing, ToM tasks like irony and empathy require referen-
tially opacity, whereby what is said is not what is meant. An
opaque  context represents someone’s beliefs, not about a
referent,  but about a referent represented in a particular
manner (Kamawar and Olson, 2011). Epistemic opacity
(involving constructions using the verb know) predicts false
belief  in 3- to 7-year old children (Kamawar and Olson,
2009). Opacity, then, is a medium through which ToM is
expressed, and children with TBI, even those with TBI of a
milder  character, have difﬁculty with opaque communica-
tions carrying ToM information, such as irony and empathy.
Cognition, affect, and conation have long been regarded
as  separable components of mental function, from German
faculty psychology of the 18th century and Scottish and
lumetric data.
 ˇ p-Value
−.139 .397
.200 .225
.202 .461
.144 .623
−.145 .446
−.012 .974
.503 .088
−.208 .549
e overall model was signiﬁcant. We explored the individual predictors
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British association psychology of the 19th century to more
recent  trilogies of mind (Hilgard, 1980). Evidence from our
sample  of children with TBI supports the idea of at least
partial separability of the three forms of ToM.
Long ago, MacLean (1949) noticed the dissociation of
cognition and affect in brain-injured patients. The separa-
bility  of Cognitive ToM from Affective and Conative ToM
is  supported by the fact that children with Severe TBI
were  impaired on all three forms of ToM, whereas chil-
dren  with Mild–Moderate TBI were impaired on Affective
and Conative ToM. This data suggests that the threshold
for perturbation for Affective and Conative ToM is lower
than  that for Cognitive ToM, a conclusion supported by
recent  animal research arguing for a stronger relation of TBI
severity  to cognitive outcome than to social-affective out-
comes:  In mice, all levels of TBI severity disrupt affective
outcome, but only severe TBI impairs cognitive outcome
(Washington et al., 2012).
Despite  variability in deﬁnitions of conativeness
(Militello et al., 2006), the consensus is that it refers to
a  separable component of the mind (Hilgard, 1980). We
found  some support for the separability of Cognitive ToM
from  Affective and Conative ToM. Comparing performance
on  the Affective and Conative tasks, we found accuracy to
be  signiﬁcantly higher on Conative than on Affective ToM.
4.2.  Social cognitive challenges of children with TBI
Participants in a social dyad must develop an on-line
representation of a dynamic and changing mental model
of  each other’s beliefs, expectations, emotions, and desires
(Ybarra  and Winkielman, 2012) and then update this
model with a representation of their personal history of
social-affective inﬂuence on (and from) that person. Many
children  with TBI may  lack key ToM skills needed for dyadic
participation.
Although children with severe TBI had more severe
ToM deﬁcits, even milder forms of TBI disrupted ToM tasks
involving affect and conation. Assertions that milder forms
of  TBI have no lasting functional consequences need to be
moderated in light of new evidence about the vulnerability
of children with milder TBI to social cognitive impairment.
The ecological relevance of social cognitive deﬁcits to
social  skills, social problem solving, and real world, real
time  social relationships remains to be fully established.
It is known, for instance, that the number of close friends is
correlated  with individual differences in mentalizing skills
(Stiller  and Dunbar, 2007). Facial expressions provide an
overt  cue about others’ intentions; for example, anger and
fear  result in a “vigilant” style of scanning compared to
non-threat facial expressions (e.g., sad, happy, and neutral)
(Green  et al., 2003). Detecting others’ intention to approach
or  avoid may  shape social interactions (Adams et al., 2006).
Sharing  others’ emotional states enhances the synchrony of
brain  events across individuals, which may  promote under-
standing  of their intentions and actions (Nummenmaa
et al., 2012).Children with TBI who are insensitive to affective
and conative information may  face negative social conse-
quences. In our TBI sample, children with severe TBI were
rated  higher in rejection-victimization than children withtive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39
OI,  and were less likely than children with OI to have a
mutual friendship in their classroom; in addition, children
with  TBI without a mutual friend were rated lower than
those  with a mutual friend on sociability-popularity and
prosocial behavior and higher on rejection-victimization,
and had lower peer acceptance ratings (Yeates et al., in
press).
Childhood TBI, even of relatively mild degree, is asso-
ciated with de novo changes in personality and behavior
(Dennis et al., 2001a,b; Levin et al., 2004, 2007; Max  et al.,
2005,  2006, 2011, 2012), as well as in inhibitory control
(Leblanc et al., 2005; Sinopoli et al., 2011; Sinopoli and
Dennis, 2012). It remains to be understood how post-injury
changes in personality and inhibitory control are related to
social  cognition and peer relationships.
Domain-general processes like inhibitory control and
working memory develop in concert with ToM. In one
view,  poor inhibitory control reduces the child’s experi-
ence  of the volitional nature of mental states and thereby
limits the emergence of ToM (Russell, 1997); in an alter-
native  view, the emergence of ToM precedes inhibitory
control (Perner, 1998; Perner and Lang, 2000) because ToM
provides  a suitable platform for novel, misleading, and
interfering schemes. In a study modeling the causal paths
linking  working memory, inhibitory control, and ToM in a
smaller  group of children with TBI (Dennis et al., 2009b),
we  found that the relation between inhibition and ToM
was  fully mediated by working memory, although working
memory did not mediate the relation between anatomical
frontal lobe injury and ToM. How domain-general pro-
cesses  and ToM are causally related in the present TBI
cohort is a topic of current investigation.
Irony and empathy are social skills that lubricate social
discourse. Irony and empathy modulate social distance:
Irony mutes criticism and establishes social distance,
while empathy gives comfort and maintains connected-
ness. Irony and empathy express social rules, and allow the
social  modulation of emotional expression. Irony allows
a  social evaluation of praise, blame, and responsibility to
be  communicated without angry confrontation. Deﬁcits in
irony  and empathy are likely to affect a child’s success in
key  life situations in the home, classroom, playground, and
sports  arena (McCauley et al., 2012).
Social deﬁcits after TBI may  have a negative effect on
the  development of more general cognitive skills. It is
known  that the ability to sustain a mismatch between
experienced and communicated emotion not only pro-
vides  social advantages, but also provides a cognitive
advantage because it expands the boundaries of cognitive
categories to include atypical exemplars when the environ-
ment  becomes atypical (Huang and Galinsky, 2011).
4.3.  Neural networks supporting social cognition
Lesions in the neural networks important for social cog-
nition  are common in this cohort of children with TBI.
Signiﬁcant volume differences assumed to reﬂect atrophic
change (Bigler et al., 2010) were consistently observed in
the  Severe TBI group across all regions of interest. New
information is that lesions occur both in the most com-
mon  large-scale brain networks (DMN, CEN, SN) and in two
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etworks implicated more speciﬁcally in the social func-
ions  of mentalizing and empathy. Also new is the ﬁnding
hat  lesions in large-scale neural networks occur not only
n  children with severe TBI, but also in those with TBI of
esser  severity. To be sure, TBI produces lesions in several
rain networks with overlapping anatomy and physiology,
nd  the meaning of patterns of TBI damage remains to be
ore  fully understood.
Nearly  one-quarter of the TBI sample sustained lesions
n  the DMN, a ﬁnding of interest in light of recent pro-
osals that the DMN  overlaps with brain regions involved
n  social cognition (Schilbach et al., 2008). In looking at
rain  volume-function correlations, we found that greater
olumes in two hubs of the DMN, the posterior cingulate
ortex and the hippocampal formation, predicted better
onative ToM. The mechanism of this relation remains to be
stablished.  It is possible that social cognitive impairments
ccur in part because of failure to deactivate the DMN  in
ynchrony with activation of task-relevant networks, an
ssue  to be explored further in functional imaging studies.
Lesions in the MNEN were signiﬁcantly related to
oorer Conative ToM. These data extend the range of neu-
oimaging data relating empathy to components of the
NEN  (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti and
inigaglia, 2010; Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007). However,
ognitive and Affective ToM were not signiﬁcantly related
o  lesions or brain networks, although on fMRI studies,
imilar tasks have shown network activations. Structural
esion and volumetrics may  be less related than fMRI meas-
res  to ToM outcomes; for example, while children with
BI  show reduced white matter and problems in mental
tate attributions, the correlations between DTI and behav-
oral  measures are similar in TBI and control groups (Levin
t  al., 2011). Long-term structural changes after childhood
BI  (Wu et al., 2010), including alterations in the expected
attern of brain development (Wilde et al., 2012), may pro-
uce  a functional reorganization of the social brain; for
xample, patterns of brain activation in a social cognition
ask change after adolescent TBI (Newsome et al., 2012).
unctional imaging of ToM measures remains to be fully
xplored.
Some  of the networks or network hubs damaged in
hildren with TBI may  be related to social functions we
id  not assess. Social network size correlates with amyg-
ala  volume and the volume of brain regions implicated in
oM  (Bickart et al., 2011; Dunbar, 2012). Relative to adults,
hildren have weaker intrinsic integration and segregation
f  amygdala circuits with subcortical, paralimbic, limbic,
olymodal association and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Qin  et al., 2012). One entailment of this is that damage
o the SN, including to the amygdala, may  easily disrupt
unction in a weakly developed network. Lesions and vol-
me  reduction in the SN occur with some frequency in our
hildren  with TBI, and we found group differences in amyg-
ala  volume, which may  have consequences for friends and
ocial  networks, not tested here.
Social challenges increase in adolescence. To support
he increased number and complexity of social rela-
ionships, the adolescent brain undergoes considerable
tructural maturation (Gogtay et al., 2004), particularly in
egions  implicated in social cognition (Choudhury et al.,tive Neuroscience 5 (2013) 25– 39 37
2006).  Over development, a dynamic reconﬁguration of
both  structural and functional connectivity occurs in the
core  networks, involving increased integrity along within-
and  between-network pathways (Sommer et al., 2010;
Vogel  et al., 2010; Uddin et al., 2011). In adolescence, efﬁ-
ciency  of emotional ToM develops in parallel with brain
maturation (Choudhury et al., 2006).
Our pre-adolescent participants will soon emerge into
a  challenging adolescence in which they will struggle to
acquire  a full complement of adolescent social cognitive
skills. As adolescents, their social cognition will be doubly
fractured, with dysfunctional childhood skills and a fail-
ure  to develop adolescent skills. As pre-adolescents, they
have  damage to key regions of the social brain, which will
not  only limit social cognition, as we  have shown, but also
truncate or slow normal structural maturation of their ado-
lescent  brains. The TBI groups in the present cohort, if
followed longitudinally, may  experience considerable dif-
ﬁculty  meeting the social demands of adolescence.
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